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THE NARRATIVE OF COSTS, THE COST OF
NARRATIVE
Alexander A. Reinert †

Why is this belief so enduring, when it has never been supported by a single
empirical study of costs, as opposed to beliefs about costs? 1
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INTRODUCTION
Battles over procedure occur on multiple levels. At the most
granular level, litigants, usually through lawyers, use procedural tools to
advance their interests in individual cases. At the most abstract level, the
procedural rules we select are products of a complex balance of
intersecting and competing interests.
This creates predictable problems. At the abstract level, all else
being equal, there is likely consensus that the best procedural rules are
those that best ensure just outcomes without being too costly or
inefficient. 2 But there will always be differences of opinion as to the
substantive content of these values as well as how to balance them. And
Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law.
Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, Defining the Problem of Cost in Federal Civil
Litigation, 60 DUKE L.J. 765, 786–87 (2010) (alteration omitted) [hereinafter Lee & Willging,
Defining the Problem].
2 Rule 1 encapsulates these values, with its focus on justice, speed, and cost. See FED. R.
CIV. P. 1.
†
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even if we can put aside differences about how both to define and weigh
justice, cost, and efficiency, it is indisputable that at the granular level
procedural rules offer an opportunity for litigants in individual cases to
undermine justice, impose unnecessary costs, and foster inefficiency.
Procedural rules, after all, even ones that depart from the federal
system’s default choice of trans-substantivity, 3 are blind to which party
to a lawsuit is objectively “right.” And so procedural rules sometimes
can benefit the strategic litigant at the expense of the deserving one.
Judge Victor Marrero’s Article, The Cost of Rules, the Rule of Costs,
is an attempt to both diagnose and intervene at the abstract and
granular levels of procedure. 4 His diagnosis: too many lawyers use too
many procedural devices to cause too much inefficiency and impose too
high cost on the system. 5 His prescription: operating at both the abstract
and granular level, he proposes changes big and small to our procedural
regime. 6
Judge Marrero’s observations and suggestions should be taken
seriously. He has served as a judge for nearly two decades and prior to
that he had extensive experience as a lawyer in both the public and
private sector. When a judge with his experience speaks, people will pay
attention—which is precisely why it is also important to critically engage
with his article. And while I found some aspects of Judge Marrero’s
Article compelling, I have serious reservations about his diagnosis and
some of his prescriptions.
In this Article, I will highlight some of my concerns, but they boil
down to this: in terms of diagnosis, I am simply not convinced that
Judge Marrero has compellingly demonstrated that in the run of cases,
our procedural rules are being abused in ways that undermine justice
and increase cost and inefficiencies. In part, this is a data-driven
critique—there is little empirical support for the proposition that our
procedural system is too costly in most cases. But my critique is also an
attitudinal one. Judge Marrero makes much of the extent to which
litigants fail—claims that are dismissed, motions that are lost, etc.—and
finds in these instances proof of unnecessary cost and rampant
inefficiency. But Judge Marrero’s assessment, I fear, overlooks
fundamental values that are advanced even when litigants seek legal
relief and are ultimately unsuccessful. 7 Even if one accepts Judge
3 For a discussion of the trans-substantive approach to procedure, see generally Geoffrey
C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery Vices and Trans-Substantive Virtues in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2237 (1989). One notable example where federal law departs form
trans-substantive procedure is in the area of constitutional litigation on behalf of people
confined in prisons and jails. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (2012).
4 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 1599 (2016).
5 Id. at 1632–42.
6 Id. at 1675–91.
7 I have covered this topic more extensively in other work. See Alexander A. Reinert,
Screening Out Innovation: The Merits of Meritless Litigation, 89 IND. L.J. 1191 (2014)
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Marrero’s diagnosis, some of his prescriptions will create their own
inefficiencies, and sometimes undermine justice, in ways that Judge
Marrero does not sufficiently address.
This is not to say that everything runs smoothly in every case in
federal court. Litigants use procedural rules to their advantage
sometimes unfairly and in ways that create unnecessary burdens on
courts and others. It is worthwhile to consider ways to address these
instances; however, one should not confuse anecdotal reports with
systemic dysfunction, and one should always consider the downstream
consequences of procedural interventions meant to address both
individual and systemic problems.
I. THE DIAGNOSTIC NARRATIVE: THE ECHO CHAMBER
OVERWHELMS THE DATA
Many critics of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Federal Rules)
have a standard account of why reform is necessary. Simply put, the
liberality of the Federal Rules permits too many insubstantial claims to
survive and, because discovery obligations are broad, the costs of
discovery outrun the value of the claims. 8 Judge Marrero begins his
Article by rehearsing this standard account, cataloging the various fora
in which concerns about rising cost and inefficiency in the federal
judicial system have emerged. 9 The narrative will be familiar to people
steeped in the history of debates about federal procedure (and it is a rich
history), 10 but Judge Marrero’s goal is different than most. He professes
some agnosticism about whether indeed the account is accurate. 11 But
where other critics lay the blame for alleged inefficiencies on the
[hereinafter Reinert, Meritless].
8 Many scholars have discussed these arguments in great detail in other work over several
decades. See Marc Galanter, News from Nowhere: The Debased Debate on Civil Justice, 71 DENV.
U. L. REV. 77, 83–90 (1993); Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court,
and Trials on the Merits: Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV.
286, 302 (2013); Linda S. Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray: The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive
Discovery Abuse and the Consequences for Unfounded Rulemaking, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1393,
1397–1409 (1994) (describing and rebutting arguments about excessive costs); Danya Shocair
Reda, The Cost-and-Delay Narrative in Civil Justice Reform: Its Fallacies and Functions, 90 OR.
L. REV. 1085, 1087–89 (2012); Judith Resnik, The Domain of Courts, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2219,
2219–20 (1989).
9 Marrero, supra note 4, at 1601–08.
10 For some examples, see generally Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Litigation Reform:
An Institutional Approach, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1543 (2014); Brooke D. Coleman, The Efficiency
Norm, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1777 (2015); Christopher M. Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 81 TEX. L.
REV. 551 (2002); Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1 (2010); Judith Resnik, Failing Faith:
Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494 (1986); Stephen N. Subrin, How
Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective,
135 U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1987); see also sources cited supra note 8.
11 Marrero, supra note 4, at 1603–06.
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liberality of the Federal Rules, Judge Marrero places blame squarely on
the legal profession. 12 The insight that drives Judge Marrero’s Article is
that accepted tenets of legal practice, informed by law firms’ business
models, create cost and inefficiency, not the Federal Rules themselves. 13
And because it is so important to his argument, it is the first place I
pause.
There are two essential elements to Judge Marrero’s central theme
that lawyers, not the Federal Rules, bear responsibility for increasing
inefficiency in litigation. The first element is empirical—although Judge
Marrero professes agnosticism about the extent to which inefficiency
and runaway costs run rampant in federal civil litigation, he needs the
reader to accept this narrative as empirically rooted in reality to accept
the heart of his argument. The second element is causal—Judge Marrero
needs us to accept that lawyers, not the Federal Rules, are the root cause
of inefficiency and high costs, to accept his prescriptive argument. My
main goal in this Section is to explain why I remain skeptical of both
Judge Marrero’s empirical and causal claims, but precisely because
Judge Marrero could be read as indifferent to whether critics’ standard
account is based in reality, I first explain why I think he ultimately needs
readers to accept the standard account to trust the remaining arguments
made in his Article.
As Judge Marrero lays out the standard account of cost and
inefficiency, he is careful to pepper his narrative with language of
“perception” and allegation rather than demonstrated proof. 14 He
acknowledges that much of the rhetoric may be heated by “anecdotal
horror stories and subjective impressions . . . .”15 One might, therefore,
be left with the impression that Judge Marrero himself is unsure
whether the standard account is rooted in reality. Judge Marrero,
however, ultimately takes the narrative of abuse and waste as a given—
speaking of the “historical and statistical record”16 that “convey[s] that
despite the reformers’ periodic attempts to realize change, the offending
practices have neither ceased nor abated, let alone improved litigation
practice over time.”17
To be sure, even as Judge Marrero takes the standard account as a
given, he sources it in a different problem than most critics—not in the
Id. at 1607.
Id.
14 Id. at 1603 (“That perception [of widespread discovery abuse] still underlies much of the
criticism of court proceedings that regularly arises nowadays from various segments of the legal
profession.”); id. at 1604 (“Such perceptions have engendered responses and proposals from
various sources and with shifting focus.”); id. at 1605 (stating that attorneys’ responses to 2009
Federal Judicial Center study “suggest” that attorneys themselves recognize that they impose
unnecessary costs through some litigation tactics); id. at 1605–06 (discussing opposing
perspectives of plaintiffs’ and defense bar at 2010 Duke Conference).
15 Id. at 1606.
16 Id. at 1632.
17 Id. at 1606–07.
12
13
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liberality of the Federal Rules, but the “things many attorneys
themselves do, omit to do, or condone in the course of everyday practice
that directly produce the excess and magnify the unpleasantries of
litigation, and thus that unnecessarily multiply the costs of legal
services.” 18 This is Judge Marrero’s causal argument, but for it to have
any force, the argument requires that the reader accept the standard
narrative of runaway costs in federal civil cases.
In many ways, I think Judge Marrero’s message is one worth
communicating—lawyers, a self-regulating profession, should take
responsibility for our own excesses. Changing the Federal Rules may not
help matters if we do not change professional practices that create
perverse incentives. As Judge Marrero observes, nothing in the Federal
Rules obligates attorneys to file frivolous complaints or baseless
motions, nor to make “abusive demands for discovery.” 19 But in the
same breath, Judge Marrero glides over the question of how real these
problems are, referring to abuses that “lawyers themselves complain are
now commonplace” or to “extreme methods” which, according to
“critics’ accounts,” have become “virtually obligatory in much litigation
today.” 20 These are forceful accusations. In the end, although Judge
Marrero talks in the language of “perception” and acknowledges that
much of the rhetoric may be overblown, his premise is that “the justice
system, like a boat running against a strong current, has been waging a
losing battle.” 21 I will spend the rest of this Section demonstrating why I
think, putting aside Judge Marrero’s different take on causation, his
acceptance of the standard account is problematic. I will then turn to
why I believe the additional evidence he relies upon to bolster his causal
argument is insufficient to carry the day.
At the outset, I think a personal confession is in order. In the nearly
two decades that I have worked as a lawyer, I have almost always
represented plaintiffs in civil rights cases. The lawyers on the other side
of the “v” in my cases have almost always been better resourced public
agencies or large law firms. To the extent that much of Judge Marrero’s
Article reads as a critique of the business model of large law firms, I
might be one of the last people expected to step in and question the
critique. But the procedural battles of the past several decades are often
driven by narratives that appear neutral on their face but obscure the
underlying stakes and interests. 22 This makes for an unhealthy dialogue
Id. at 1632.
Id. at 1642.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 1607–08; see also supra note 14 and accompanying text.
22 As just one set of examples, the presumptive limits on discovery devices such as
depositions and interrogatories were proposed as a way to reduce costs and abuse across the
board. See Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 137 F.R.D. 53, 104 (1991) (“The information explosion of
recent decades has greatly increased the potential cost of wide-ranging discovery and thus
18
19
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about procedure that raises the specter (and sometimes reality) of
interest-group lobbying rather than principled decision-making. 23
A.

Exploring the Narrative of Runaway Costs

It is fair to say, as Judge Marrero points out, that almost from their
inception the Federal Rules have prompted debate and criticism about
how well they balance justice, efficiency, and timeliness. 24 But these
critiques are often anecdotal, impressionistic, and, in many cases,
conscious attempts to tilt the playing field one way or another in the
absence of hard empirical evidence. Judge Marrero finds, however, that
simply the existence of anecdotal reports and complaints is verification
enough of a problem:
Even to the extent that it is merely based on anecdotal horror stories
and subjective impressions, what lawyers relate about litigation abuse
and attendant costs suggests that the underlying issues are real and
substantial, and that their impacts not only reach the front lines of
everyday law practice, but penetrate much farther so as to unsettle
the very foundation of our justice system. 25

This logic is reminiscent of comments made by Judge Paul V.
Niemeyer in 1998, who repeated the then-prevailing account that 80%
of costs of a case are attributable to discovery, even while acknowledging
that there was no empirical data in support of the claim. 26 For Judge
Niemeyer, “the fact that the claim was made and is often repeated by
others, many of whom are users of the discovery rules, raises a question
of whether the system pays too high a price for the policy of full
disclosure in civil litigation.” 27 One cannot fail to think of the Bellman
in Lewis Carroll’s poem, who declared three times that he and his crew
had found “‘just the place for a Snark! I have said it thrice: What I tell
increased the potential for discovery to be used as an instrument for delay or oppression.”). But
limiting discovery tends to favor those with access to information, usually defendants over
plaintiffs. As Judith Resnik has observed more generally, “[i]n short, we do not all suffer the
civil rules equally.” Resnik, supra note 8, at 2225.
23 See, e.g., Scott Dodson, A Negative Retrospective of Rule 23, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 917, 935
(2017) (describing how procedure has become “increasingly polarized and politicized”); Linda
S. Mullenix, Hope over Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery and the Politics of
Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REV. 795, 844–56 (1991) (discussing interest group lobbying in multiple
procedural contexts); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Politics and Sociology in Federal Civil Rulemaking:
Errors of Scope, 52 ALA. L. REV. 529, 542–45 (2001) (discussing the “ideological and
distributional battle” behind different procedural reform proposals).
24 See, e.g., Lee H. Rosenthal, From Rules of Procedure to How Lawyers Litigate: ‘Twixt the
Cup and the Lip, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 227, 228–30 (2010) (describing the history of criticism of
federal rules of procedure).
25 Marrero, supra note 4, at 1606.
26 Paul V. Niemeyer, Here We Go Again: Are the Federal Discovery Rules Really in Need of
Amendment?, 39 B.C. L. REV. 517, 518 (1998).
27 Id.
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you three times is true.’” 28
But the leap from anecdotal reports to concluding that there is a
real and substantial problem to be solved is a dangerous one. Procedural
reform has more and more been driven by interest groups, who have a
particular incentive to put forward narratives about the impact of
procedural rules. 29 Many years ago, Richard Marcus responded by
arguing for neutrality, or at least as much neutrality as can be hoped for:
In some instances those who seek to advance their interests through
civil litigation reform are overt about what they are doing, but many
who seek advantage through reform proposals do not act so
transparently. Thus, skepticism about hidden agendas sharpens our
antennae as we scrutinize arguments phrased as neutral. This is a
proper attitude to take toward much of the litigation crisis bombast
that has become so common in the last ten years. Though it is
phrased in general terms and purports to further neutral interests of
society or the court system, in the hands of many this rhetoric seems
to be narrowly gauged to serve the interests of a certain sector. 30

The narrative of discovery and litigation abuse is generally driven
by defendants, particularly those in particular kinds of cases. The history
has been recounted at various times by others, and I will not repeat it
here. 31 Suffice to say, it has been supported by questionable empirics. 32
Careful empirical work that rebuts the narrative rarely receives
attention, for reasons beyond the scope of this author and this Article.
But for decades, researchers, including those at the Federal Judicial
Center, have provided data that undermine the narrative only to see
overheated rhetoric about runaway costs take over and motivate
reforms. 33

28 LEWIS CARROLL, THE HUNTING OF THE SNARK 3 (1876) (quoted in Parhat v. Gates, 532
F.3d 834, 848–49 (D.C. Cir. 2008)) (alteration omitted).
29 See Resnik, supra note 8, at 2219–20 (“I believe we cannot and should not ignore the
political content and consequences of procedural rules. Over the last decade, a variety of
powerful ‘repeat players’ have sought, sometimes openly, to influence ‘court reform’ efforts. By
and large, that work has been done not by letters written to the Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules, but rather by lobbying efforts directed towards legislatures and the public, by wellfinanced media campaigns, and by support for conferences and meetings to address and
describe the ‘litigation crisis.’ However appealing might be the notion that writing the Rules of
Civil Procedure (in contrast to the Rules of Criminal Procedure) is a ‘neutral’ task with diverse
consequences on anonymous and interchangeable civil plaintiffs and defendants, that
description is no longer available. ‘Tort reform,’ among other events of the last decade, has
denied us the refuge of a comforting image.”).
30 Richard L. Marcus, Of Babies and Bathwater: The Prospects for Procedural Progress, 59
BROOK. L. REV. 761, 772 (1993).
31 See generally Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Giving the “Haves” A Little More: Considering the
1998 Discovery Proposals, 52 SMU L. REV. 229, 243–49 (1999).
32 See, e.g., id. at 244–45 (recounting the figure trotted out by Judge Paul V. Niemeyer that
discovery “accounts for 80 percent of litigation costs”) (quoting Niemeyer, supra note 26, at
518).
33 Id. at 246–48 (summarizing studies).
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The importance of calling out the erroneous, data-free assumptions
behind this rhetoric should not be overstated. As many commentators
have observed, some of the most effective anti-litigation procedural
doctrine has been fed by a narrative about abuse and out of control
costs. 34 Accepting the narrative as a given perpetuates myths that
interfere with a balanced discussion about procedural choices. 35 To the
extent there are hard empirical data, they suggest that discovery abuse is
focused on a small subset of cases on the federal docket, while the
procedural reforms prompted by this narrative tend to have greater
impact in the very cases that do not support the discovery abuse
narrative. 36 The extreme cases drive the narrative and prompt reforms,
and the impact of the reforms will be felt most in the cases in which
there are minimal discovery costs.
Indeed, Judge Marrero uncritically cites Arthur Miller, a leading
author in this area, as if Miller subscribes to the litigation explosion
myth, 37 even though, in the article cited by Marrero, Miller makes clear
his view that the myth is mostly perception and assumption rather than
a data-driven conclusion:
The foregoing shows that the supposed litigation crisis is the product
of assumption; that reliable empirical data is in short supply; and that
data exist that support any proposition. Thus, one should be cautious
and refrain from trumpeting conclusions on the subject lest it
distract us from serious inquiry. Yet despite the lack of a solid
foundation for it, the perception of a “litigation explosion” or
“liability crisis” drives the “reform” movement. 38

If much of the debate is prompted by strategic attempts to
influence the rule-making process, which as many have observed has
become highly politicized and tilted towards defense interests, then one
should be very careful about concluding much from bellyaching on
either side about the supposed excesses and abuses from opposing
counsel. Take, for example, the 2009 report by the American College of
34 Stephen N. Subrin & Thomas O. Main, Braking the Rules: Why State Courts Should Not
Replicate Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 67 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 501,
520–21 (2016) (“A majority of the Supreme Court’s pleading, summary judgment, class action,
compulsory arbitration, and justiciability jurisprudence, starting in the 1980s, has been
similarly influenced by a mindset that assumes, without empirical support, that civil litigation is
in some sense ‘out of control’ and infused with discovery abuse.”).
35 Id. at 520.
36 Stephen N. Subrin & Thomas O. Main, The Fourth Era of American Civil Procedure, 162
U. PA. L. REV. 1839, 1850–51 (2014) (“Thus the cases where discovery abuse is most likely are
also least likely to be constrained by the new discovery rules. Meanwhile, cases in which there is
little or no discovery will suffer the additional transaction costs.”); Thornburg, supra note 31, at
248–49.
37 Marrero, supra note 4, at 1604 n.9.
38 Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation Explosion,” “Liability
Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78
N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 996 (2003).
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Trial Lawyers (ACTL), 39 cited by Judge Marrero and often held up by
critics of liberalized procedure as proof that our procedural system
perpetuates waste and inefficiency. 40 Methodologically, the survey lacks
some of the telltale indications of empirical rigor—the sample of lawyers
was biased (three-quarters of respondents represented defendants
exclusively or primarily), and not particularly experienced in federal
litigation (fewer than 20% litigated in federal court). 41 There are, in fact,
no findings that are specific to federal court or federal procedure. 42 The
“data” are impressionistic and anecdotal, exactly the kind of vague
interest-group driven rhetoric one should be cautious about
instantiating into law. Judge Marrero’s quotation from the report is
consistent with this impression. 43 And notably, the proposals contained
within the report are literally a grab-bag of defense-friendly procedural
changes (making proportionality central to discovery, shifting from
notice pleading to fact pleading, etc.). 44 And the report’s most
“radical”—by its own account—proposal would cut plaintiffs’ cases out
at the knees, especially in those kinds of cases where there is
informational asymmetry (such as civil rights or employment
discrimination claims): providing only “limited additional discovery”
solely upon a showing of “good cause and proportionality” after the
parties provided anemic initial disclosures. 45
Indeed, the weight of empirical evidence suggests that many of the
complaints are apocryphal rather than data-driven. Thanks to research
conducted by the ablest of researchers, what we know is that discovery
costs are not disproportionate in the vast majority of cases. 46 The
Federal Judicial Center’s (FJC) 2009 closed-case study shows that in
almost all cases discovery costs are modest and proportionate to

39 AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS & INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS.,
FINAL REPORT ON THE JOINT PROJECT OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS TASK
FORCE ON DISCOVERY AND THE INSTITUTE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL
SYSTEM (2009) [hereinafter ACTL REPORT].
40 Some have characterized the ACTL as carrying water primarily for defense-oriented
interests in civil cases. See Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and
Legal Pluralism, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1393, 1418 (1993) (describing “tort reform proposals”
favored by ACTL); James E. Rooks Jr., Will E-Discovery Get Squeezed?, 40 TRIAL 18, 18–19
(2004) (describing ACTL as an organization that, “while nominally neutral, [is] populated
largely by corporate and insurance defense counsel”).
41 ACTL REPORT, supra note 39, at 2.
42 Id. at 2 (discussing results of survey).
43 Marrero, supra note 4, at 1603 (“Lawyers depicted discovery proceedings as costing too
much and having ‘become an end in [themselves],’ as well as ‘impractical in that they promote
full discovery as a value above almost everything else.’”) (quoting ACTL REPORT, supra note 39,
at 2).
44 ACTL REPORT, supra note 39, at 5–7.
45 Id. at 9. The ACTL did recommend a correspondingly “slightly broader” initial disclosure
rule. Id. at 7–8.
46 For a helpful recent summary of the available empirical evidence, see Reda, supra note 8,
at 1088–89.
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stakes. 47 Just as in 1993 48 and in 2000, 49 when the standard narrative was
used to argue for cutting back on access to discovery, evidence of
system-wide, cost-multiplying abuse does not exist.
The FJC’s 2009 study, discussed in Judge Marrero’s Article, is
worth going over in some detail. In late 2008, the Committee on Rules
of Practice and Procedure asked the FJC to look closely at discovery
costs in civil cases and to report its findings to the May 2010 conference
on civil litigation at Duke University Law School. 50 To do so, the
researchers self-consciously designed their research to find cases that
involved as much discovery as possible. They excluded cases “in which
discovery and discovery-related issues would be unlikely to occur.” 51
They also eliminated any case that was terminated less than sixty days
after it had been filed. 52 The study therefore likely over-represented how
much discovery takes place in a typical civil case in federal court.
The FJC’s closed-case survey found the median cost of litigation,
including attorneys’ fees, was $20,000 for defendants and $15,000 for
plaintiffs. 53 These figures came as a surprise to many, particularly
proponents of reform who had long assumed that litigation costs
routinely careen out of control in federal civil cases. Just as significant—
and perhaps just as surprising to many observers—were the FJC’s
findings with regard to the overall percentage of total litigation costs
attributable to discovery. Discovery costs were reported by plaintiffs’
lawyers to account, at the median, for only 20% of the total litigation
costs; the median figure reported by defendants’ lawyers was 27%. 54
47 EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., NATIONAL CASE-BASED
CIVIL RULES SURVEY: PRELIMINARY REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES (2009), http://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/materials/08/
CivilRulesSurvey2009.pdf [https://perma.cc/FDY5-VNNZ] [hereinafter FJC 2009 STUDY]; see
also Lee & Willging, Defining the Problem, supra note 1, at 771.
48 See Mullenix, supra note 8, at 1410–43 (strongly criticizing the “soft social science”
opinion evidence used by the rule makers behind the 1993 reforms, while noting that the
findings of the methodologically sound empirical studies did not support the reforms).
49 See James S. Kakalik, Deborah R. Hensler, Daniel McCaffrey, Marian Oshiro, Nicholas
M. Pace & Mary E. Vaiana, Discovery Management: Further Analysis of the Civil Justice Reform
Act Evaluation Data, 39 B.C. L. REV. 613, 636 (1998) (evaluating the RAND corporation study
of the 1993 reforms, which found that under that set of rules, lawyer work hours on discovery
were zero for 38% of general civil cases, and low for the majority of cases); see also id. at 650
tbl.2.10 (showing that while discovery costs grow with the size and complexity of a case, the
proportion of total costs they represent does not dramatically increase; the median percent of
discovery hours for the bottom 75%, top 25%, and top 10% of cases by hours worked were 25%,
33%, and 36% respectively); Thomas E. Willging, Donna Stienstra, John Shapard & Dean
Miletich, An Empirical Study of Discovery and Disclosure Practice Under the 1993 Federal Rule
Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REV. 525, 531–32 (1998) (finding that under the 1993 amendments, the
median reported proportion of discovery costs to stakes was 3%, and that the proportion of
litigation costs attributable to problems with discovery was about 4%).
50 FJC 2009 STUDY, supra note 47, at 5.
51 Id. at 77.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 2.
54 Id.
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Perhaps most importantly, the reported costs of discovery, including
attorney’s fees, amounted to just 1.6% of stakes of the case for plaintiffs
and only 3.3% of the case’s value for defendants. 55 This means, of
course, that in half of all civil cases, the costs of discovery amounted to
even less than 1.6% of the case’s value for plaintiffs and less than 3.3% of
its value for defendants. The FJC’s data therefore fail to show that
disproportionality of discovery costs to the value of a case is a serious
problem.
The FJC’s study also identified characteristics that are associated
with high litigation costs. The most significant is the amount of money
at stake in the litigation, with factual complexity highly correlated with
more expense. 56 Law firm economics also have an important impact on
litigation costs. When other variables are controlled for, law firm size
alone more than doubles the costs, and hourly billing also tends to make
costs higher. 57 This should not be surprising—that costs are higher with
larger firms does not demonstrate that those firms unnecessarily gin up
costs because of their business model. Complex, high-stakes cases may
be riddled with high discovery costs. Whether these costs are
unjustifiably high has not been demonstrated.
Judge Marrero does not discuss any of these limitations or findings
from the empirical data. Instead, he slips far too easily from the “smoke”
of attorney complaints to the conclusion that something is
fundamentally wrong with our legal system. Sometimes where there is
smoke there is fire; sometimes there is just smoke and mirrors.
And to the extent that Judge Marrero argues that lawyers are
imposing unnecessary burdens on courts, and therefore the public, it is
worth noting that filings in federal court have been static over the past
fifteen years, while a significant percentage of pending cases are
aggregated in multi-district litigation. 58 As civil filings have been
stagnant, judicial resources have increased—because criminal caseloads
have increased, however, what this means in practice is that the
workload of a federal district court appears to have increased very
modestly over the past thirty years. 59 Reflecting this stasis, median
disposition time has remained basically stable over the past three
decades. 60 Courts are becoming more involved in helping to resolve
Id.
See Lee & Willging, Defining the Problem, supra note 1, at 783.
57 Id. at 784.
58 See Judith Resnik, “Vital” State Interests: From Representative Actions for Fair Labor
Standards to Pooled Trusts, Class Actions, and MDLs in the Federal Courts, 165 U. PA. L. REV.
1765, 1768–72 (2017) (presenting data on filings and MDLs).
59 Patricia W. Hatamyar Moore, The Civil Caseload of the Federal District Courts, 2015 U.
ILL. L. REV. 1177, 1197–98 tbl.4 (reporting a decreased load for civil cases but overall increased
load of 16% per district judge, when weighted for complexity and when accounting for civil and
criminal cases).
60 Id. at 1199.
55
56
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cases than ever before, but many view this as a feature, not a bug, of our
procedural system.
On the surface, even though Judge Marrero takes a superficially
agnostic posture on whether the accounts of discovery abuse and the
like can be credited as accurate depictions of the federal system as a
whole, his narrative implicitly accepts the standard account. Judge
Marrero’s main target is lawyers, who he refers to as “the leading
actor[s] in this drama” because of their “responsibility for rising
litigation excess produced by professional styles and actions of lawyers
themselves.” 61 It should be obvious that one cannot, on one hand, claim
indifference to whether reports of discovery abuse are accurate, and at
the same time say that the real problem lies with lawyers themselves. If
the claims of abuse are overstated for rhetorical and strategic purposes,
then there is no need to search for other responsible actors for a
problem that does not exist—the real problem is feeding the echo
chamber by repeating defense-oriented talking points without engaging
with the literature that raises empirical and motivational questions
behind these talking points. Here, I fear Judge Marrero’s Article
contributes to the problem.
B.

The Role of Lawyers’ Professional Practices

For those readers who are not convinced by the foregoing, I will
turn my focus instead on the responsible party Judge Marrero wants to
bring into the fold: lawyers themselves (and Judge Marrero seems
focused on a particular kind of lawyer), 62 and their role in abusing
procedural rules to increase costs. Judge Marrero identifies two “forces”
that are related to this abuse: (1) the “professional attitudes” adopted by
lawyers; and (2) specific strategic choices lawyers make that create
inefficiency and delay, and amplify costs. 63
Judge Marrero relies on two principal sources to support his claim
that the problems of inefficiency and abuse are driven by lawyering
practices—empirical data provided to him from the Administrative
Office of the U.S. Courts and results of a survey conducted by the FJC
and published in 2010. For reasons I will explain, neither is sufficient to
support Judge Marrero’s thesis that lawyers are regularly engaged in
abusive practices that cause unnecessary burdens on courts, opposing
counsel, and the public.
Marrero, supra note 4, at 1609.
It is worth noting that Judge Marrero’s description of the legal practice and economy that
he thinks is responsible for certain ills in our justice system would probably not resonate with
most small-firm practitioners or non-profit lawyers. His description of changes to legal
practices and the billing economy seem almost entirely about large corporate law firms.
Marrero, supra note 4, at 1610–20.
63 Id. at 1632.
61
62
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Taking the 2010 FJC study first, I note that Judge Marrero quotes
selectively from responses by some lawyers who reported to the FJC that
lawyering practice was driven in part by fee-generating concerns. 64 But
the FJC authors themselves note at the outset that, although they believe
their survey is useful for understanding how rules of procedure operate,
“the comments made in the interviews do not represent a random crosssection of the views of respondents to the case-based survey.” 65 Indeed,
the comments appear to be from a very small self-selected group of
people—thirty-five attorneys who either expressed interest in being
interviewed on their own or who responded to an invitation to a slightly
larger group of attorneys. 66 One does not have to be a sophisticated
empiricist to know that this is hardly an ample sample size to draw
conclusions about how the entire federal procedural system is
functioning. But even if it were, reading the FJC study as a whole, it is
not clear that it fully supports Judge Marrero’s conclusions. Yes, many
attorneys reported that billing practices were connected at least in part
to costs, but mostly in the context of discovery not motion practice. 67 As
discussed below, much of Judge Marrero’s focus is on motion practice,
primarily motions to dismiss and for summary judgment. In the FJC
survey, many attorneys did not think that motions to dismiss played a
large role in generating costs, and as to summary judgment, attorneys
representing plaintiffs had substantially different views about abusive
practices as compared to attorneys representing defendants, raising
questions as to whether the anecdata are truly reliable or simply
reflective of selective observation or strategic posturing. 68 For all of these
reasons, the FJC’s 2010 study cannot bear the weight Judge Marrero
places upon it.
Second, there is still Judge Marrero’s empirical data, which he
concludes establishes the wasteful conduct of lawyers who bring
unsuccessful (or abandoned) dispositive motions to dismiss or for
summary judgment. Judge Marrero first observes that dispositive
motions are filed in a substantial portion of cases in federal court
(litigants file motions to dismiss in 35% of cases and motions for
summary judgment in 40% of cases). 69 He then notes that these motions
64 Id. at 1634 (citing THOMAS E. WILLGING & EMERY G. LEE III, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., IN
THEIR WORDS: ATTORNEY VIEWS ABOUT COSTS AND PROCEDURES IN FEDERAL CIVIL
LITIGATION 10 (2010)).
65 THOMAS E. WILLGING & EMERY G. LEE III, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., IN THEIR WORDS:
ATTORNEY VIEWS ABOUT COSTS AND PROCEDURES IN FEDERAL CIVIL LITIGATION 1 (2010),
https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/CostCiv3.pdf [https://perma.cc/PL7F-TTDE].
66 Id. at 1–2. Sixteen of these attorneys primarily represented plaintiffs, twelve primarily
represented defendants, and seven represented plaintiffs and defendants about equally. Id. at 2.
67 Id. at 12–13. In the report’s discussion of summary judgment, most attorneys reported
that most costs already had been incurred through discovery and there was no discussion of
summary judgment practices being driven by billing concerns. Id. at 29–33.
68 Id. at 29–30.
69 Marrero, supra note 4, at 1633.
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“achieve clear, complete victories in only about 20% of the actions.” 70
And he further observes that about almost half (45%) of motions to
dismiss and almost a third (30%) of motions for summary judgment are
“withdrawn or abandoned by the parties” before they are resolved by a
court. 71 It is unclear as an initial matter why Judge Marrero takes the
position that a motion to dismiss or motion for summary judgment that
is only partially successful results in “no net gains” for the litigant
bringing the motion. 72
I will not quarrel with these figures themselves, 73 although it is
always preferable when reporting empirical data unavailable to the
public that one provides more specifics as to methodology. Assuming
these figures to be correct, the conclusion Judge Marrero draws from
them is not, in my opinion, supportable. For Judge Marrero, the fact
that motions to dismiss achieve a “complete victory” in fewer than a
third of proceedings “reflect litigation deficiencies.” 74 And similar
results in motions for summary judgment are indicative, in Judge
Marrero’s words, of a procedural strategy that “produce[s] no net gains,
and in fact could result in a calamitous setback for the summary
judgment motion proponents.” 75 Judge Marrero ultimately concludes:
On any given day, therefore, a major part of our courts’ business
entails unnecessary or avoidable proceedings that cannot be
satisfactorily explained nor justified on any ground reasonably
related to advancing the needs of the particular case, any legitimate
interest of the litigants, or the mission of the justice system. 76

Here I think it is important to step back and consider the context
in which successful and unsuccessful litigation activity occurs. For the
purpose of simplicity, I will identify some predominant tracks on which
litigation can play out in federal court:

This is obviously far from the universe of potential case trajectories

Id.
Id.
72 Id. at 1667.
73 There are other data that suggest that the rate of dispositive motion practice may be
lower. See JOE S. CECIL, GEORGE W. CORT, MARGARET S. WILLIAMS & JARED J. BATAILLON, FED.
JUDICIAL CTR., MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM AFTER IQBAL 8 (2011),
http://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/MotionIqbal.pdf [https://perma.cc/H8SZ-ESQP]. It
appears that Judge Marrero obtained statistics directly from the Administrative Office of the
U.S. Courts. See Marrero, supra note 4, at 1653 n.109.
74 Marrero, supra note 4, at 1653.
75 Id. at 1667.
76 Id. at 1633–34.
70
71
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and does not take into account pre-litigation settlement or any action on
appeal. But within these straightforward tracks there are many different
ways in which parties can seek a court’s intervention in the matter (and
I read Judge Marrero’s Article as focused primarily on how attorneys
abuse the federal procedural regime by unnecessarily using practices
that burden the court with wasteful litigation tactics). From Judge
Marrero’s perspective, the complaint that is dismissed was wasteful
because it lacked merit. 77 Similarly, the motion to dismiss that fails to
resolve in a complete dismissal of the plaintiff’s complaint is a waste of
time and effort and, rather than indicative of good-faith professional
judgment, is instead a means to gin up litigation costs. 78 The same goes
for motions for summary judgment—a motion that is unsuccessful or
withdrawn serves no purpose, per Judge Marrero, other than to abuse
procedural rules and drive up costs. 79 And discovery is wasteful in Judge
Marrero’s world if it takes place in a case that is never tried but
ultimately settled. 80
But there are, to my mind, several dimensions along which these
data do not necessarily line up with these conclusions. First, as an
empirical matter, there are several unanswered questions posed by these
data. The general numbers reported by Judge Marrero are not, for
example, disaggregated according to some critical factors. They are not
disaggregated by case type along multiple dimensions. For Judge
Marrero to conclude, for example, that a higher failure rate of motions
to dismiss is consistent with billing-driven filings, one would expect to
see higher failure rates when motions to dismiss are brought by large
firms where billing practices are said to dominate strategic decisions
more than other firm models. One also would expect the success rates of
motions to dismiss to be higher in certain kinds of cases (say, civil rights
claims), when the defendants are represented by public-funded lawyers
rather than by private counsel. 81 But Judge Marrero does not parse the
data along these lines even though we know that a vast majority of
litigation in the federal courts is conducted by lawyers who we would
not expect to have the kinds of perverse profit motives that Judge
Marrero identifies in his Article.
In fact, there are empirical data available that call into question
Judge Marrero’s assumptions about the relationship between motion
practice and law firms’ economic models. For example, I conducted a
study of over 5,000 decisions on motions to dismiss made in the years
2006 and 2010. The goal of the study was to understand better what
Id. at 1633.
Id.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 1660–62.
81 To be clear, one would need to conduct this study within civil rights cases because there
would otherwise be confounding variables that result in differing success rates.
77
78
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impact the plausibility pleading doctrine might be having on resolutions
of motions to dismiss, but I reported data that bear on the question
presented in Judge Marrero’s Article. 82 Most pertinent, I examined how
motions to dismiss were resolved across different case types, some of
which we would expect to be associated with large firm defense lawyers
(employment discrimination, antitrust, financial instruments, wage and
hour, and intellectual property), 83 and some of which we would expect
to be associated with public agency defense lawyers (prison cases and
civil rights cases). 84 If Judge Marrero’s hypothesis that large firms tend
to file more meritless motions solely to drum up costs were true, 85 then
one would expect a lower rate of success in the former set of cases. But
the data do not support that conclusion—the highest success rates of
motions to dismiss in both 2006 and 2010 were found in cases where
one would expect both billing-driven motion practice and merits-driven
motion practice. 86 Nor do other data, generated by the FJC using a
different methodology, support Judge Marrero’s hypothesis. 87
But let us move past these empirical questions to a different
question: just what can one conclude from lawyers seeking court
intervention and failing? Judge Marrero concludes that failure equates
with waste, and waste suggests unnecessary choices driven by economic
motives rather than good-faith strategy, but this is far from obvious.
First, people seek judicial intervention for legitimate reasons, even if
they believe there is a risk, sometimes a high risk, of failure. Start with
plaintiffs, who bring cases that they might think have a high risk of
failure for completely legitimate reasons. Sometimes it is because they
believe that the law is in a process of change. There is only one way to
create change in a world in which some of our most important law is
made by courts: bring cases that will, especially on the cusp of change,

82 See generally Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Impact of Plausibility Pleading, 101
VA. L. REV. 2117 (2015).
83 Although I did not specifically code for wage and hour and intellectual property claims,
they were encompassed by the “other” category of cases in my study. Id. at 2140.
84 Id. at 2146 tbl.3.
85 See Marrero, supra note 4, at 1633–34.
86 In 2006, the success rate for motions to dismiss was bunched around 50% in antitrust,
civil rights, and financial instruments cases. See Reinert, supra note 82, at 2146 tbl.3. In 2010,
motions to dismiss were most successful in civil rights and financial instruments cases, at
around 70% for both, with about a 50% success rate in employment discrimination, prison,
antitrust, and “other” case types. Id.
87 See CECIL, supra note 73, at 14 tbl.4 (reporting rates of success in motions to dismiss
ranging from 60—70% in a variety of case types in both 2006 and 2010). Judge Marrero also
looks to contested motions for awards of attorneys’ fees to suggest that “litigation excess is real
and severe.” Marrero, supra note 4, at 1631. But he fails to recognize the serious selection bias
that is present when looking at these cases—they reflect those cases in which the parties could
not agree on a reasonable fee without seeking court intervention. There is no reason to believe
that they reflect a majority or even a substantial portion of cases in which these disputes could
arise. Id.
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fail more often than not. 88 Change in the law is deeply connected to
failure in the law. There is perhaps no better example than the line of
litigation that led to the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of
Education, 89 or, to take more recent examples, the Supreme Court’s
decisions regarding discrimination against same-sex couples. 90 Failure
paved the way to some of the Supreme Court’s most important
constitutional decisions.
Second, even if plaintiffs do not believe they have a fighting chance
to change law as announced by courts, they might instead bring a case
to expose the injustice in legal doctrine, prompting change in other
contexts. 91 Again, so long as plaintiffs have a good faith argument for
their legal position, there is nothing illegitimate about using courts as
levers in social movements. As Thurgood Marshall once said about the
desegregation-era cases, “[t]he greatest gains from this period was the
public education of school officials, the courts and the general public in
the lawlessness of school officials . . . .” 92 Finally, plaintiffs might bring
claims because they have been treated unjustly even if the law does not
recognize this unjust treatment as actionable. Certainly it is preferable
for plaintiffs to seek relief this way rather than engaging in self-help.
And on the other side, defendants might seek legal relief through
motions to dismiss or for summary judgment for some of the same
reasons—defendants can try to change the law through these motions
just as plaintiffs may be trying to change the law through filing
complaints resting on novel legal theories. Take the Supreme Court’s
decisions in Bell Atlantic v. Twombly 93 or Ashcroft v. Iqbal. 94 Prior to
those cases, the Supreme Court had for fifty years rejected attempts by
defendants to impose heightened pleading requirements in particular
areas. 95 In both Twombly and Iqbal, the defendants had lost in the lower
courts based largely on the Supreme Court’s prior decisions. 96 From

31.

88

I address this dynamic in full in other work. See Reinert, Meritless, supra note 7, at 1224–

89 See id. at 1229 n.223 (discussing litigation leading to the Supreme Court’s decision in
Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
90 Compare Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015), with Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810
(1972).
91 Jules Lobel, among others, has written about this approach to litigation. See, e.g., JULES
LOBEL, SUCCESS WITHOUT VICTORY: LOST LEGAL BATTLES AND THE LONG ROAD TO JUSTICE IN
AMERICA (2003).
92 Thurgood Marshall, An Evaluation of Recent Efforts to Achieve Racial Integration in
Education Through Resort to the Courts, 21 J. NEGRO EDUC. 316, 318 (1952).
93 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
94 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
95 See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512–13 (2002) (rejecting heightened
pleading in employment discrimination context); Leatherman v. Tarrant Cty. Narcotics
Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993) (holding that heightened pleading
for civil rights claims brought against municipalities is “impossible to square . . . with the liberal
system of ‘notice pleading’ set up by the Federal Rules”).
96 In Twombly, the Second Circuit had reversed the district court’s dismissal of the
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Judge Marrero’s perspective, what looks like wasteful motion practice
ultimately led to a change in the law. I am no fan of the Supreme Court’s
new pleading regime, but I can recognize the role that defense counsel
played in developing the law by bringing motions that, in the moment,
were unlikely to succeed.
Moreover, the broader problem with Judge Marrero’s critique is
that it takes an ex post result (the failure of a particular motion) to draw
a conclusion about the ex ante legitimacy of a decision to engage in a
particular litigation tool. Even if they are unlikely to advance new legal
doctrine, defendants might bring motions that have even a high rate of
failure if the cost of bringing the motion is lower than the value to the
client of a successful motion multiplied by the likelihood of success of
the motion. Imagine that filing a motion to dismiss costs $10,000 to the
client and that it has only a 20% likelihood of success. If discovery costs
will be, say, more than $50,000, then it makes economic sense for a
defendant to file the motion. One would of course have to build in other
potential costs, such as defending a successful dismissal on appeal. But
the point is that one cannot conclude, simply because we know ex post
that many motions fail, that it is economically irrational or irresponsible
ex ante to file a motion. From an economic perspective, it may not at all
be wasteful (depending on the stakes of the case) to engage in
dispositive motion practice that is more likely to fail than succeed.
Relatedly, even if motions to dismiss or for summary judgment do
not help to develop the law, they can play an important role in helping
to resolve a case even when they fail to result in a complete dismissal of
a complaint. A motion that resolves some of the claims in a case, for
example, changes the value of the case to both parties. 97 By resolving
uncertainty about some of the claims in the case, the motion has
clarified the relative strengths of each parties’ position. This is true of
motions for summary judgment as well. 98
Motions for summary judgment provide an even more important
function because, as Judge Marrero observes, much of the work that is
done preparing a motion for summary judgment is the kind of work

plaintiffs’ antitrust complaint. Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp., 425 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2005). In Iqbal,
the Second Circuit had affirmed the district court’s denial of the defendants’ motions to
dismiss. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2007). In the interest of full disclosure, I was one
of the attorneys for the plaintiffs in Iqbal, and I argued the case in district court, the court of
appeals, and the Supreme Court.
97 See, e.g., Steven S. Gensler & Lee H. Rosenthal, Managing Summary Judgment, 43 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. 517, 531 (2012) (discussing ways in which partial summary can narrow issues in cases
or reduce need for certain discovery).
98 As for motions that are withdrawn or abandoned, it is difficult to see what Judge Marrero
finds to criticize. See Marrero, supra note 4, at 1633. If the parties can spare a court from
spending time resolving the motion because motion practice in the absence of a judicial
decision helps to more clearly frame the issues, it is far from clear that the motion represents a
waste of resources for anyone.
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that one would need to do to prepare for trial. 99 If, as Judge Marrero
would appear to prefer, the parties instead went straight to trial in some
cases, it is unclear how that would save anyone time and effort. To
prepare for trial, parties would have to do much of the same work,
sifting the record for the discovery critical to their case, connecting the
legal theories to the evidence adduced through discovery, etc. Of course,
preparing motion papers takes time apart from sifting the record, so the
question becomes whether that time is worth the expense given the
likelihood that at least some of the claims presented in the case would
have greater clarity after the motion for summary judgment is decided.
Moreover, if there is a trial and a judgment, some of the work of
preparing post-trial motions becomes less arduous having already done
the work of preparing for summary judgment. After all, the standard for
a post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law “mirrors” the
standard on summary judgment, 100 and although trial will present a
slightly different record than was on paper at the summary judgment
stage, there will nonetheless be substantial overlap.
I am perhaps most puzzled by Judge Marrero’s suggestion that
spending time on discovery only to have a case settle before trial
represents wasted energy and resources and likely is motivated by
attorney billing practices rather than principled legal strategy. Judge
Marrero suggests that most depositions are unnecessary because “the
testimony they record is geared for trials that rarely take place.”101
Moreover, according to Judge Marrero, “only small portions of the
massive records counsel nowadays routinely gather, especially in
complex cases, are truly essential” to resolving the case. 102 He concludes
with the following question: “For what trials, then, are litigants
conducting such extraordinary discovery proceedings as a matter of
customary practice?” 103
There are several answers to Judge Marrero’s question. First, much
like his argument regarding failing motions, he conflates ex post
knowledge with ex ante predictions. It may be clear, after having
engaged in discovery, that a large portion of it was unnecessary. That is
99 After all, to prepare a motion for summary judgment, one has to scour the record for the
evidence most relevant to the matter at hand, determine the vulnerabilities in one’s own claims
or defenses, and assess the strength of the opposing party’s evidence. See Gary T. Foremaster,
The Movant’s Burden in a Motion for Summary Judgment, 1987 UTAH L. REV. 731, 734 (“Even
when a motion for summary judgment is denied, benefits accrue because an exchange of
information occurs, and the parties may use the information to better prepare their respective
cases for trial.”); Jonathan T. Molot, An Old Judicial Role for a New Litigation Era, 113 YALE L.J.
27, 44 (2003) (“By forcing parties to focus on the merits of their positions, and by educating
parties regarding a suit’s likely value, summary judgment opinions can serve some of the same
purposes as the settlement conference.”).
100 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986).
101 Marrero, supra note 4, at 1660.
102 Id. at 1662.
103 Id.
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different from concluding, prior to seeking discovery, that the attorney
knows which modes of discovery, which documents, which depositions,
will or will not be useful to sussing out the merits of a case. 104 That, after
all, is the very purpose of discovery. It would be obviated to some degree
if there were truly broad mandatory initial disclosures in civil cases, but
that is a different battle entirely. Second, it is hard to understand why
Judge Marrero would criticize lawyers for taking discovery and settling
in the shadow of trial. I take it as a given among trial lawyers that
discovery is essential to framing settlement. In many cases it is pointless
to have settlement discussion absent discovery. It hardly strikes me as an
indication of wasted resources that litigants would take discovery and
decline to litigate the case to trial. Rather, this is much more likely a
rational assessment of the costs (mostly in attorneys’ fees) that would be
incurred should the matter go to trial. And discovery, much like
decisions on motions to dismiss or for summary judgment, simply
provides more relevant information to enable parties to accurately
assess their forward-looking risk. It is, in fact, unclear what Judge
Marrero believes would be preferable—not have parties take discovery
and settle in the absence of full information? Or go to trial unprepared
for the other sides’ case? Or, more troublingly, not balance the power
dynamic in play when there is informational asymmetry? Indeed, the
most “radical” and transformative aspect of the Federal Rules might just
be the mutual discovery obligations they embrace. 105 In a world in which
information is not equally distributed, muscular discovery obligations
are more likely to ensure that litigants are truly equal before the law.
This is not meant to deny, as Judge Marrero notes, that plaintiffs
sometimes file complaints for illegitimate reasons—to secure coercive
settlements, to harass or annoy, etc. Nor can it be denied that
defendants bring motions that are meant to impose unnecessary
burdens on the other side; or that some lawyers might engage in
practices that are motivated, in whole or in part, by the desire to pump
up billing records. And lawyers on both sides can surely be accused in
some cases of imposing high discovery costs that are disconnected from
the merits of the case. Judge Marrero’s call for an examination of how
lawyers use and sometimes abuse our procedural system is perfectly
appropriate. At the same time, we should not rush to judgment on the
basis of anecdote or empirics that should be analyzed with more nuance.
104 In light of this problem, Scott Moss suggests deferring “close decisions on possibly useful
but costly evidence until meritorious cases separate from the pool.” Scott A. Moss, Litigation
Discovery Cannot Be Optimal but Could Be Better: The Economics of Improving Discovery
Timing in a Digital Age, 58 DUKE L.J. 889, 890 (2009).
105 George B. Shepherd & Morgan Cloud, Time and Money: Discovery Leads to Hourly
Billing, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 91, 94 (“For the first time, all litigants could force their adversaries
to provide extensive information about the adversaries’ cases.”); Ezra Siller, The Origins of the
Oral Deposition in the Federal Rules: Who’s in Charge?, 10 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 43, 91 (2013)
(describing contemporaneous responses to introduction of Federal Rules).
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II. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF PROCEDURAL CHANGE
I finally want to turn to some of Judge Marrero’s proposals for
change. I think many of them may be worthwhile to consider, but in the
interest of space I will focus on two that are directed at what Judge
Marrero believes are systemic problems in our federal civil system: (1)
the filing of broad blunderbuss complaints; and (2) the filing of
unnecessary motions for summary judgment. Here, I will raise some
concerns about potential unintended consequences of Judge Marrero’s
proposals.
With respect to plaintiffs’ complaints, Judge Marrero has several
suggestions. He proposes that plaintiffs be required to file a verified
statement as part of their initial complaint “detailing their efforts to
communicate with the defendants to discuss the dispute.” 106 And even
after doing so, plaintiffs should “begin prosecuting their actions by
launching the litigation with the best-grounded claims against the most
definite defendants while holding any other uncertain claims and
defendants in reserve.”107 As to the first suggestion, it is my experience
that plaintiffs often send a so-called “demand letter” to defendants in
advance of litigation, but this is admittedly anecdotal. There is evidence
that the vast majority of disputes never end up in court, 108 which might
reflect lack of access to legal services, the low stakes of most disputes
that could be litigated, or pre-filing settlements. But let us assume for
the moment that, in those cases that are litigated, some or perhaps most
plaintiffs’ counsel do not already follow the practice of sending demand
letters. For Judge Marrero’s proposal to do work (assuming one could
overcome Rules Enabling Act barriers), 109 it would have to be true that
the value of this pre-filing procedure, in increasing pre-filing resolution,
outweighs the potential costs (including the time spent preparing and
responding to the demand letters, the risk of putting a defendant on
notice of the pendency of litigation, and the cost of delay). Given that
most judges are now encouraged to ask about settlement at the initial
case conference, 110 I am not convinced that the proposal would bear
fruit.
As to the second suggestion, I have more serious reservations.
Judge Marrero claims in a footnote that the notion of proceeding only
with the best claims against the “most definite defendants” is “startingly
Marrero, supra note 4, at 1675.
Id. at 1651.
108 Joanna C. Schwartz, What Police Learn from Lawsuits, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 841, 875
n.185 (2012) (collecting sources suggesting that, across a range of case types, “[m]ost people
who believe their rights have been violated never sue”).
109 The Rules Enabling Act prohibits the adoption of Federal Rules that “abridge, enlarge or
modify any substantive right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012).
110 FED. R. CIV. P. 16(a)(5), (c)(1).
106
107

142

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:121

simple,” analogizing the strategy to suing pseudonymously named
defendants when one is unaware of their identity. 111 But he appears to
overlook the serious statute of limitations problems that would arise
with this strategy—indeed, those problems are best exemplified by
claims brought against Doe defendants. In many circuits, including the
Second Circuit, it is very difficult to “relate back” a complaint filed
against a Doe defendant after one learns their identity. 112 It would prove
even more difficult to do so for known defendants who a plaintiff
consciously fails to include in a complaint simply because, at the time of
filing, her claims against that defendant are not among the “bestgrounded” claims. Moreover, it creates potential prejudice for the
excluded defendant, who will not be present at discovery proceedings or
court proceedings, which might affect the contours of a case once the
defendant is ultimately added. 113 Finally, it ignores the problem of
informational asymmetry by essentially punishing plaintiffs simply
because they lack full information when we know that in many kinds of
cases, defendants have superior access to relevant information. 114 Given
the narrowing of discovery from information related to the “subject
matter” of the litigation to “claims and defenses,” 115 it is not even clear
how a plaintiff would obtain discovery relevant to a putative defendant
who the plaintiff excluded from the initial complaint under Judge
Marrero’s proposal.
I understand the motivation behind Judge Marrero’s proposals—
plaintiffs’ counsel surely sometimes file “shotgun” complaints against
too many defendants. The Federal Rules do account for this practice. 116
However, and more importantly, the Federal Rules contemplate that a
plaintiff need not sue only those defendants against which the plaintiff
Marrero, supra note 4, at 1651 n.107.
See Barrow v. Wethersfield Police Dep’t, 66 F.3d 466, 469–70 (2d Cir. 1995), modified, 74
F.3d 1366 (2d Cir. 2016); see also Heglund v. Aitkin Cty., 871 F.3d 572, 580 (8th Cir. 2017)
(collecting cases). The Second Circuit has limited Barrow’s holding somewhat, holding that
relation back could occur in some situations involving pseudonymously-named defendants
when doing so is permissible under applicable state statute of limitations law. See Hogan v.
Fischer, 738 F.3d 509, 518–19 (2d Cir. 2013).
113 Cf. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 685–86 (2009) (noting that even defendants who are
not subjected to formal discovery demands may be burdened by discovery against other parties,
because of the need “to participate in the process to ensure the case does not develop in a
misleading or slanted way that causes prejudice to their position”).
114 See Alexander A. Reinert, Pleading as Information-Forcing, 75 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1,
32–35 (2012) (discussing informational asymmetry in context of pleading doctrine).
115 As originally enacted, the Federal Rules permitted parties to obtain discovery relevant to
the “subject matter” of the litigation. The 2000 amendments changed this presumption so that
the scope of discovery was limited to material relevant to “claims and defenses,” permitting
discovery to be broadened if the requesting party could demonstrate “good cause.” In 2015, the
“good cause” safety valve was eliminated, meaning that parties could only obtain discovery
relevant to claims and defenses but not the “subject matter” of the litigation. For a thorough
discussion of these changes, see generally Adam N. Steinman, The End of an Era? Federal Civil
Procedure After the 2015 Amendments, 66 EMORY L.J. 1 (2016).
116 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b).
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has the best-grounded claims. 117 There are costs to this liberal approach
to pleadings, but benefits as well.
Judge Marrero’s suggestions regarding summary judgment
procedure prompt similar questions and challenges. As I read it, Judge
Marrero proposes, among other things, having an expedited trial in lieu
of summary judgment, with the judge making a Rule 50 decision after
close of the plaintiff’s case in chief. 118 Judge Marrero finds support for a
procedure like this in Rule 52. 119 This raises some questions.
First, does this mean that the plaintiff’s case will be presented solely
to the judge so that the judge can make a Rule 50 determination? If so, it
seems likely that this would create more inefficiencies in terms of costs,
thereby making the proposal counter-productive. This is for a variety of
reasons. First, both parties would likely still expend a significant amount
of energy and time on trial preparation. They would sift through the
record, prepare witnesses, etc. Indeed, they might end up spending
more lawyer time (and therefore billable hours) on this procedure than
on summary judgment. It all depends on how much time attorneys will
have to spend sifting the record (something one has to do for summary
judgment as well as for trial) as opposed to preparing motion papers
(although presumably if this alternative became more common,
attorneys would start filing written Rule 50 motions that look a lot like
Rule 56 motions). 120
Second, the outcome would not necessarily advance the issues. If
the judge denies the Rule 50 motion, the parties are left in the same
place as if the judge has denied a motion for summary judgment—and
now they will have to have a full-blown trial, with jury selection (in cases
in which there is a jury trial). Assuming that the case has only been
presented in front of the judge, this will mean going back and repeating
the plaintiff’s case in chief. If the Rule 50 motion is granted, the parties
would be in the same place as if the summary judgment motion had
been granted. And we would expect to see appeals from those grants in
the same proportion as we now see appeals from grants of Rule 56
motions.
If instead Judge Marrero is proposing that the plaintiff’s case
should be presented in front of a jury, there are ways in which it could
both increase and decrease efficiency. Efficiency could be advanced if
the court denies the Rule 50 motion at the close of the plaintiff’s case.
Then we have basically eliminated summary judgment by defendants in
favor of full-blown trials. 121 But, again, query how much this has
FED. R. CIV. P. 8(d) (permitting pleading in the alternative and inconsistent pleading).
FED. R. CIV. P. 50.
119 Marrero, supra note 4, at 1678–79 (referencing FED. R. CIV. P. 52).
120 FED. R. CIV. P. 50, 56.
121 The framers of the Federal Rules originally meant for summary judgment to be used by
plaintiffs in debtor judgment cases. See Stephen B. Burbank, Vanishing Trials and Summary
117
118

144

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:121

reduced costs if all of the time spent preparing for trial overlaps with the
time spent preparing a summary judgment motion. There is no question
that there is substantial overlap; I take it as an open question as to how
much overlap there is.
Indeed, Judge Marrero’s proposal could lead to greater inefficiency
if the court grants the Rule 50 motion. In that event, the plaintiff will
almost certainly appeal and if the plaintiff prevails on appeal, the case
will be returned to the district court to be tried again. This is why most
judges almost never grant Rule 50 motions at the close of a plaintiff’s
case—the cost of being wrong in terms of judicial efficiency is far too
high.
CONCLUSION
Narratives matter. They capture our imagination and spur us to
action. They can lead us astray as surely as they can lead us to water. For
decades, rising costs and inefficiency has been one dominant narrative
in procedural debates. Judge Marrero’s Article helpfully asks us to focus
on the role of the lawyer and law firm economics in assessing how to
solve waste and abuse in civil litigation. But it also reinforces a narrative
that, in my view, obscures some of the nuance in procedural reform. In
this brief Article I have highlighted points of contention based both on
data and on concerns about unintended consequences.
At the same time, I am confident that some of Judge Marrero’s
prescriptions are surely sensible whether or not they are supported by
sophisticated empirical evidence. And some procedural problems will
not be amenable to data-based inquiry. Sometimes we will have to be
satisfied with fumbling towards the right procedure through experience.

Judgment in Federal Civil Cases: Drifting Toward Bethlehem or Gomorrah?, 1 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 591, 592 (2004). It has expanded to be used almost exclusively by defendants,
which was not the apparent intent of the drafters of the 1938 Amendments.

